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Abstract: In this article we examine the potential effect of market structure on
hospital technical efficiency as a measure of performance controlled by ownership
and regulation. This study is relevant to provide an evaluation of the potential
effects of recommended and initiated deregulation policies in order to promote
market reforms in the context of a European National Health Service. Our goal
was reached through three main empirical stages. Firstly, using patient origin data
from hospitals in the region of Catalonia in 1990, we estimated geographic
hospital markets through the Elzinga-Hogarty approach, based on patient flows.
Then we measured the market level of concentration using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index. Secondly, technical and scale efficiency scores for each hospital
was obtained specifying a Data Envelopment Analysis. According to the data
nearly two-thirds of the hospitals operate under the production frontier with an
average efficiency score of 0.841. Finally, the determinants of the efficiency scores
were investigated using a censored regression model. Special attention was paid
to test the hypothesis that there is an efficiency improvement in more competitive
markets. The results suggest that the number of competitors in the market
contributes positively to technical efficiency and there is some evidence that the
differences in efficiency scores are attributed to several environmental factors such
as ownership, market structure and regulation effects.
Key Words: Geographic markets, market concentration, technical efficiency, data
envelopment analysis, censored regression model.
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I. Introduction
Deregulating policy measures promoting market reforms in health care markets are
common in all health care systems of developed countries (Abel Smith and
Mossialos, 1994). A coincidental point in health care reforms of National Health
Services (NHS) lies in the introduction of competition among producers of health
services, specially among hospitals, by splitting financing, contracting and
producing functions. Competition may be achieved by the introduction of quasi-
markets or internal markets (Maynard, 1991) even in a publicly financed health
care system, with publicly and/or privately owned producers. In all cases the
degree of market competition appears as a fundamental tool in the most part of
health care reforms (OECD, 1996).
The Spanish health care system is no an exception to the prevailing
proposed reforms. Interest in the determination of hospital markets in Spain
derives from the government’s intention to reform the health care sector creating
internal markets to control costs and improve efficiency. This proposition contains
some elements for encouraging competitiveness.
Spanish public health care system has a universal coverage, with 78 per
cent of public financing and 67 per cent of public production. Catalonia is a region
of six million inhabitants in the Spanish State. The health care system in Catalonia
presents some specificities relevant in the context of this paper. First, it is
characterised by a mixture of private (for-profit and nonprofit) and public
hospitals. Second, it has developed an innovative contracting policy and payment
system since 1982 in contrast to the predominance of public producers and cost
reimbursement policy in the rest of the country. Third, it is the region of the
country that first announced and applied advanced deregulating policy measures
in the health care system.
In order to assess the expected effects of proposed policies it is very
important to detect the potential effects of changes in market structure on hospital
technical efficiency. In this paper we develop an initial evaluation of the effects
of observed present market structure on hospital technical efficiency in all Catalan
acute care hospitals. Current evidence may bring forward observations on
outcomes from projected policies.
Studies of hospital markets generally assume that the market area coincides
with an existing geographical or geopolitical entity. In contrast to this assumption
our empirical analysis is based on patient origin data to measure geographic
hospital market. The market level of concentration was estimated using the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index. This paper contributes to the existing literature on3
performance and hospital market structure by defining a two-stage approach. First,
a nonparametric and deterministic method (Data Envelopment Analysis, DEA), is
applied to the measurement of the best practice frontier and technical inefficiency
scores. Then, we apply a censored regression model to find out the importance of
environmental variables, specially the role played by the calculated Herfindahl-
Hirschmnan index and the number of competitors in the local market, explaining
differences in performance measures. We use efficiency scores to test the
hypothesis that there is less inefficiency in more competitive markets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II critically describes preceding
literature on measuring geographical markets and their influence on hospital
inefficiency. Method and the main results concerning market area definition and
concentration are presented in Section III. Section IV proposes an application of
DEA analysis to acute care hospitals, and an econometric model to analyse the
factors explaining inefficiency scores. Special attention is paid to the role of
market concentration while controlling other relevant factors. Concluding remarks,
are presented in the final section.
II. Recent empirical evidence
1. MEASURING HOSPITAL MARKETS
Underlying any market definition is an effort to identify the constraint on
providers. With the proliferation of merger activity among acute care hospitals in
the U.S in recent years, an appropriate determination of the relevant product
market and the relevant geographic market has become a focal point in antitrust
litigation.
The relevant product market consists of those services and products that
enable sellers to exercise their monopoly power and that prevent buyers from
switching to substitutes provided by others. Defining the product market for
hospital health care is difficult because it is essentially unique to each consumer,
as each patient needs treatment specifically tailored to his/her illness. The
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have
argued that the product market should be defined as "general acute care hospital
care". This definition could oversimplify the reality: hospitals do not compete for
generic acute care patients. Two general acute care hospitals can compete
essentially along their whole product line or they may hold local monopolies in
specialized services from which they derive a substantial proportion of their4
patients (Zwanzinger, Melnick and Eyre, 1994; Blackstone and Fuhr, 1992
1).
Although this definition has failed in part, it is still the prevailing view (Magleby,
1996).
Two general approaches have been widely proposed and used for defining
the relevant geographic market for a specific product or service. One definition is
based on movements of products’ prices
2 in different geographical areas, and the
other is based on movements of actual physical quantities of the product between
different areas.
The problem of using prices to detect markets in health care has led
economists to devise measures based on the second approach. Simple ad hoc
measures used are government-defined geographical boundaries, such as cities
(Dranove, Shanley and Simon, 1992; Dranove Shanley and White, 1993) or
metropolitan areas (Noether, 1988). Other market boundaries are health planning
areas, health service areas, 5- or 15- mile radii around a hospital (Robinson and
Luft, 1985), and the area contained within 30 minutes (i.e., a vehicle travel time
to the hospital) (Propper, 1996).
Because our primary interest in market definition derives from its use in
the calculation of market shares that are in turn used for evaluating the degree of
competition among providers, we have based our hospital market definition on the
Elzinga-Hogarty Criterion. This shipment-based technique involves measurement
of product flows into and out of an area, to detect a market area. Elzinga and
Hogarty (1973, 1978) defined a Geographic Market as one in which there is
relatively small outflow of goods to other areas (i.e., little goes out from
inside=LOFI) and relatively small inflows (i.e., little comes in from
1 Some analysis adress the question if outpatient and inpatient care are close enough substitutes
to be in the same market. Blackstone and Fuhr (1992) showed that the geographic market is
different depending on the level of care, being the smallest market associated with primary care
and the widest market with tertiary care. Primary category are very basic hospital services, such
obstetrics, general surgery, and general medicine. Secondary services require more specialized
equipment and/or personnel, such as magnetic resonance imagers or intensive care units. Tertiary
services are highly specialized, generaly provided by a teaching hospital on a regional basis.
Competition for rural patients exists between urban and rural hospitals. Rural consumers, who must
travel to obtain specialized care, may have more alternatives, especially for secondary and tertiary
care, than urban consumers.
2 The relevant geographic area for antitrust purposes, (to analyse the competitive impact of a
merger), is the smallest area in which buyers could not easily switch to providers elsewhere to
scape attemps to exercise monopoly power. This implies the possibility of producers in that market
to raise prices above competitive levels or decreas the quality of services.5
outside=LIFO
3) from elsewhere.
The logic behind this approach is simple. If producers export significant
amounts elsewhere, they will have difficulty raising prices without attempting their
external markets. Thus, those external markets must be included. Similarly, if
imports are substantial, an increase of prices will result in a substitution towards
more imports. Therefore, the geographic markets supplying the imports must be
included. The boundaries of a market are to be judged by a strong or weak
definition. The strong definition identifies a market as a geographical area where
both imports and exports must be less than 10 per cent of product flows. The
weak definition requires the same evaluations, but at 25 per cent level. The
application of these criteria to the hospitals implies that, for example, to satisfy the
75 criterion, hospitals must provide at least 75 per cent of their services to patients
residing in the market, and patients residing in the market must receive no more
than 25 per cent of their care from hospitals located in other areas (Morrisey,
Sloan and Valvona, 1988; Melnick and Zwanziger, 1988
4; and Ferguson and
Palmer, 1994).
Meanwhile, as we have observed, there are no single consensus
methodologies to define hospital markets for empirical purposes
5. The shipment’s
approach has been criticised in several studies (Noether, 1988; Werden, 1989;
Dranove, Shanley and Simon, 1992; Nguyen and Derrick, 1994; Zwanzinger,
Melnick and Eyre, 1994). In the main, these studies argued that in the hospital
industry, except for rural and isolated small urban areas, tends to be a substantial
number of patients who would move across any reasonable boundary, so that the
markets defined overstate the true size of the market. On the other hand, patient
data underestimate the market size if an anticompetitive price increase makes
shipment from greater profitable distance, which provokes patients to travel long
distance. In contrast, if some firms in the defined market area were operating at
full capacity, they could not increase output in response to an anticompetitive price
3 The LOFI component of the definition reflects conditions on the sellers’ side of the market
and the LIFO component reflects conditions on the buyers’ side of the market (Crane and Welch,
1991): Let z1=Sales of Firms in a Defined Area to Buyers in that Same Area. Let z2=Total Sales
of Firms in the Defined Area. Let z3=Total Purchases by Buyers in the Defined Area. Then the
criteria are: LOFI= z1/z2 and LIFO= z1/z3.
4 They used a hospital version of LOFI/LIFO test of shipments. The data elements used, were
the Zip codes of the patient’s residence and the hospital identifier. A Zip code was included in a
hospital’s market area if it contributed at least 3% of the hospital’s total episodes.
5 See Garnick, Luft, Robinson and Tetreault (1987) comparing different empirical measures to
define market areas.6
increase of some other firms in the same market area.
We recognize that no market definition is likely to be accurate for all
markets. The argument using patient origin data in our analysis is partially
pragmatic and partially theoretical. First, this kind of data is generally available.
The theoretical argument stems from the observation that patient origin data are
very stable. This stability is a reflection of a referral and admission patterns. In
our scenario where the patients are beneficiaries of publicly financed insurance and
they usually do not decide which hospital to use (unless the patient self-referral
to emergency room), hospitals account for a relatively fixed proportion of patients
from a given area. We do not want to measure the potential for competition
among hospitals (the number of rival firms that could enter an industry) but to
provide a snapshot of the hospital’s current competitors.
A significant dimension of competition among hospitals is the market
structure, a characterization of the intensity of competition among hospitals within
a market area. It seems reasonable to assume that providers facing different
degrees of competition in the market will have different incentives to alter their
behaviour
6. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a useful measure of market
structure. The definition of this index is the sum of squares of the market shares,
expressed as a percentage, held by each firm in an industry. The HHI reflects the
number of competitors in the market and the level of concentration in the market
(market share), factors that the economic theory would suggest are the critical













Where Si is the market share of the firm i, and n is the number of firms in
the industry. The maximum value is 10,000 (i.e., 100
2 in a pure monopoly) and
6 If the market is defined too broadly so that the hospitals that are not trully competing are
included, measures of market concentration will err on the low side. In contrast if the market is
defined too narrowly, excluding meaningful competitors, concentration ratios will err on the high
side, (Scherer and Ross (1990)).7
the minimum approach to zero
7 (in an atomistic market). This index gives greater
weight to the larger firm(s) than to the smaller firm(s), and at an increasing rate,
and embodies two aspects of the distribution of Si, in an industry: 1) The variation
or dispersion in Si, and 2) The number of firms
8. This index is used for antitrust
purposes. Consistent with the 1984 Horizontal Merger Guidelines designed by DOJ
and the FTC, the 1992 merger guidelines recognized two critical concentration
levels, in the evaluation of horizontal mergers. The HHI spectrum was divided in
three regions: "unconcentrated" (post-merger HHI<1,000); "moderately
concentrated" (1,000<post-merger HHI<1,800); and "highly concentrated" (post-
merger HHI>1,800)
9.
HHI has been used in most hospital market studies as a structural proxy of
monopoly power. An economic criticism on the HHI concept argues that such an
index itself says little about competitive behaviour. It is possible that some
industries with few firms may compete vigorously, whereas others with many
firms may not. Another factor is the fact that almost all hospital geographic
markets start out with an HHI over 1,800
10, therefore most hospital markets are
considered to be highly concentrated, because most communities have only few
hospitals, and patients generally do not consider hospitals outside their
communities to be acceptable alternatives for most procedures. As well, it has
been criticised because its behaviour depends on using a homogeneous definition
of a product.
7 This index is measured as a percentage ranging betwen zero and 100, rather than 0 to 1. Of





8 HHI is related (directly) to a specific measure of variability (the coefficient of variation V)




For the derivation of this relationship among HHI, V, and n, see Miller, R.A. (1982, pp: 615-617).
9 See Bazzoli, Marx, Arnoul and Manheim (1995) for an excellent review.
10 The lowest possible HHI value in a given market will occur when all firms have an identical
market share, a highly unusual circumstance. For a market with six firms the lowest HHI value is
1,667, for market with four firms it is 2,500 (Magleby 1996).8
2. PERFORMANCE AND MARKET STRUCTURE
In several economic sectors a number of studies concluding evidence of a positive
relation between competition and both technical and allocative productive
efficiency. Contrasting with this, in the hospital industry a large number of papers
have documented a positive relation between costs per admission or per patient-
day and more competitive markets (Hersch, 1984; Robinson and Luft, 1985).
Nevertheless, only few of these papers addressed explicitly the relation
between technical efficiency and competition. Recent empirical research estimating
econometrically a frontier cost function found weak evidence to sustain that
competition from other hospitals is related to inefficiency (Eakin, 1991;
Zuckerman et al, 1994).
A positive relation of competition with higher average cost or cost
inefficiency does not imply necessarily technical inefficiency: It might be either
a case of exclusively allocative or price inefficiency, or both technical and
allocative inefficiency in different unknown proportions. Three studies addressed
explicitly the effect of competition on technical inefficiency, being the most
relevant measure of performance for public hospitals, by explaining differences in
DEA scores. Register and Bruning (1987) did not find any relation between DEA
scores and market concentration. Chirikos and Sear’s (1994) results showed that
inefficiency scores are higher in markets with more vigorous inter-hospital
competition, the relation being more intense in highly competitive markets, and
Hadley, Zuckerman and Iezzoni (1996), using efficiency scores from a
multiproduct frontier cost function, found that hospitals in highly competitive
markets were affected significantly by interhospital competition.
Recent empirical evidence presents some limitations that deserve attention.
First, measures of concentration such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index are often
calculated for administrative regions and not for real local market areas. Second,
studies that do not try enough to identify the sources of slack are slightly useful
for the appropriate design of policies to improve performance. But there are also
those studies that consider market structure as the only explanatory factor: it is
impossible to sort out the market structure matter from the ownership and
regulation matters. And third, empirical evidence refers almost exclusively to the
North American health care system, that might not be adequate for the European
systems and with a quasi non-existent NHS evidence.
About the relation between hospital performance and local market structure,
this paper adds to the preceding literature in three aspects. Firstly, it does not
restrict attention to larger or urban hospitals since all acute care hospitals are9
considered and a Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration is calculated for
every hospital using patient origin data. Secondly, it encompasses the analysis of
a wider range of environmental variables apart from market concentration as
factors explaining efficiency, and it also considers some control variables for
efficiency scores. Ratios partially measuring inefficiency are ruled out as factors
explaining efficiency (i.e., occupancy rate, length of stay, etc.). And thirdly, it
focuses explicitly on the effects on technical efficiency (not on average
production/cost function), partitioned into scale and pure technical efficiency, and
not on cost efficiency that is not always an adequate basis to compare performance
of public, nonprofit and private hospitals.
III. Identifying markets and measuring concentration
1. DATA AND METHOD
In this article we examine the hospital market structure in the Spanish Health Care
System using specific data from Catalonia in 1990. The process of measuring
competition has involved two different parts: defining the relevant market and
identifying the competitors within each market.
In our analysis we use "general acute care hospital services" as a product
market definition. Geographic market delineation for hospital care has been based
on patient origin data. The boundaries of a market have been judged, using the
Elzinga-Hogarty Criterion, by weak definition (25% level) to avoid overstate the
size of the market. Once the product and geographic markets are defined, we
compute an overall index of competition for each market using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). Two variables are used for calculating the HHI index: 1)
A measure of the output (the number of discharges produced in each market); and
2) A measure of capacity (the number of beds in each market). Market areas have
been defined using patient and hospital flows reported in the "1990 Catalonia
Acute Hospital Discharges", a sample of the total acute hospital discharges,
collected by the Catalan Health Service in 1990. The number of observations
(discharges) used to calculate the markets were N=31,094 from 96 hospitals,
representing the 5.41% of the total discharges during 1990. A summary of
statistics appears in Table 1.
[Table 1]
To examine if the hospital product was too broadly defined, we measured
the proportion of flows from one market to another originated by the more severe
and complex cases, suggesting that more severe or complex cases may be treated
outside of the market of residence, because their treatment was not available. To10
test the differences in case complexity between markets, we define a "complex
case" as a case having a case mix weight value above one. With the information
about diagnoses
11 and length of stay we approximated for each diagnosis the case
mix weight, using the proportion between all hospitals’ average length of stay for
diagnosis j and the general average length of stay. Case mix weight was computed
for every hospital and market from individual patient data. Obviously this weight
index does not capture intra-diagnostic severity of illness.
2. RESULTS
The geographic markets were created beginning with the smallest geographic area
(the municipality) and then proceeding sequentially outwards. We identified 23
markets, twelve of which may be considered as small markets (covering less than
100,000 inhabitants) (Figure 1). The distribution of hospital market areas across
the region, falls into three groups: 1) no competing areas with eight markets
identified and 3.76% of the population; 2) a few competing areas having 1-5
neighbours, with thirteen markets identified and 32.61% of the population; and 3)
many competing areas, with two markets identified, with 10 or more neighbours
and covering more than half of the total population. Table 2 describes individual
characteristics of identified geographic markets and Table 3 examines the number
of markets that satisfy the Elzinga-Hogarty approach (75% treshold).
[Figure 1]
Administrative areas, as "districts", have been used in the literature as
geographic hospital markets. Our results show that they represent a
misspecification of geographic markets. Thirteen "districts" have been identified
with a single-hospital. However, markets do not restrict to the geographical
boundaries of these districts. Only five out of the thirteen single-hospital districts
(38.5%) were a market themselves.
A priori the results of the market 23 suggest that the market area may be
too large (Table 2). If so, we would tend to overstate the true level of
concentration. The reason could be explained if there were a difference in case
complexity between this market and the others, so the assumption of the
appropriateness of the product definition in this market could fail. To explore these
11 The diagnostic procedures had been grouped according to the International Classification of
Diseases, 9th Clinical Modification (ICD-9CM).11
considerations, primary, secondary and tertiary categories
12 were used to examine
the area’s pattern of services in order to compare each market. Only in the market
23 we identified four hospitals providing tertiary services, so a priori these
hospitals may be included in a national market for these services. But primary,
secondary and tertiary categories are somewhat ambiguous, and far from
homogeneous. For example, transplants are clearly in the tertiary category, and
normal deliveries, general medicine, and general surgery in the primary category.
The four hospitals, classified as a hospital that provides tertiary services, have the
vast majority of their patients in the former two services, so these hospitals can
compete with the other hospitals within the same market, because the product
provided is similar.
As discussed above, a measure of complexity
13 was created to see
differences in case complexity among markets. Calculated case mix weights for
all treated cases, the results showed no significant statistical difference between
patients residing outside the market but treated within the market, and patients
inside the market but treated in other markets. Then, this index does not indicate
important differences in the proxied complexity of patient flows between markets.
These facts reinforce the appropriateness of output definition (acute care) adopted
in this study (exports and imports are not different products from the cases
remaining in the market).
[Table 2]
The results concerning market concentration in Table 3 show that the
estimates of HHI are not very sensitive to whether using beds (HHIB) or
discharges (HHID) as a unit of market share measurement. Mean HHI in these
markets, using discharges as a unit of analysis (HHID), was 6,390 with 2,906 as
standard deviation. Only one out of the 23 hospital markets had an HHID below
1,000, the level considered by the DOJ as "unconcentrated".
[Table 3]
Although the results apparently speak for a concentrated market, it is
actually a two-tiered system. From the policy point of view, this study shows that
the hospital sector in Catalonia is structured in two sub-sectors. One is shaped by
twenty-two small hospital markets performing with a high level of concentration,
12 See note 1.
13 Nevertheless, the weight used is only a proxy for measuring inter-diagnostic differences.12
eight of them with only one hospital (geographic monopolies) and six with only
two hospitals, and the other one is composed by one market with 37 hospitals, 3.4
million inhabitants, and characterized by a high degree of competition. Expected
effects on performance of incentives from promoting competition policies will
probably have doubtful effects on the first sub-sector, or at least, very different
effects in comparison to the second sub-sector.
IV. Efficiency and market structure
1. EFFICIENCY DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT
The efficiency concept used is that of technical efficiency. Technical efficiency
might be characterized as either (i) the fesible increase in outputs for a given set
of inputs or (ii) the feasible reduction of inputs for a given set of outputs when
waste is eliminated. Production processes that have multiple inputs and outputs can
be compared from the point of view of efficiency by defining efficiency as the
ratio between the weighted sum of outputs and the weighted sum of inputs.
We identify each of the 94 Catalan
14 acute care hospitals as a production
unit (decision making unit) which uses different combinations of inputs per person
to produce a health service. In this section we develop the concept of efficiency
used in this article, as a measure of performance. As well, a nonparametric and
deterministic methodology of measurement is outlined.
Efficiency definition.- A hospital is said to be technically efficient if an
increase in an output requires a decrease in at least one other output, or an
increase in at least one input. Alternatively, a reduction in any input must require
an increase in at least one other input or a decrease in at least one output. To
characterize the production technology relative to which efficiency is measured,
each hospital uses variable inputsx=( x 1, ..., xN) Î
N
+ to produce variable outputs
y=( y 1 , ..., yM) Î
M
+. Inputs are transformed in outputs using a technology that
can be described by the graph: GR = {(x,y) : x can produce y}. Corresponding to
the graph there is a family of input sets: L(y) = {x : (x,y) Î GR}, y Î
M
+. Input
sets satisfy the properties of convexity and strong disposability of inputs. Input
sets contain their isoquants: Isoq L(y) = {x : x Î L(y), qx ÏL(y), qÎ(0,1)}, y Î
M
+, which in turn contain their efficient subsets: Eff L(y) = {x : x Î L(y), x’
ÏL(y), x’ £ x}, y Î
M
+. Then, a radial measure of the technical efficiency
14 Two hospitals included in the preceding analysis of market structure were dropped out
because of non data availability or erroneous information.13
(Debreu, 1951; Farrell, 1957) of input vector x in the production of output vector
y is given by: TEI (x,y) = min {q : qx ÎL(y)}, where q = 1 indicates radial
technical efficiency and q < 1 shows the degree of radial technical inefficiency.
Efficiency measurement.- Empirical measurement of inefficiency ranges
over two main alternative methodologies: From stochastic parametric regression-
based methods to nonstochastic nonparametric mathematical programming
methods. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is usually the most useful family of
linear programming models. Parametric methodology obtains efficiency measures,
computed in terms of the distance that lies between the observation and the
estimated function. Then, scores may differ according to the functional
specification chosen. DEA, in contrast, assumes no measurement error or random
fluctuations in input-output measures, being a completely deterministic method.
The method choice lies in the management of the tradeoff between functional form
rigidity and determinism. DEA has been proved specially valuable in cases like
hospitals, in many institutional settings where nonmarketed multi-output is
considered and correct weighting of outputs cannot be defined. The advantage of
this technique is that it does not impose any specific functional form on the
underlying production function. Nevertheless, to our knowledge DEA applications
to hospitals are limited to technical efficiency. There is a need to reinforce the
measures of technical efficiency with a measure of allocative or price efficiency.
Let’s assume the hospital under evaluation as having data (x
o,y
o ), and






+, and i = 1 ... I; Where I is the











i ³ 1 i = 1, ..., 0, ..., I
µ, v ³ 0
The minimization problem seeks for a set of nonnegative weights (v,µ)
which, when applied to the inputs and outputs of the hospital under evaluation,
minimizes the ratio of weighted input to weighted output, subject to the
normalizing constraint that no hospital in the sample, including the hospital under
evaluation, has a ratio less than unity when weights of the hospital under
evaluation are applied.
In order to provide a linear programming representation of the radial
efficiency measure given previously, this nonlinear ratio model can be converted













where X is an (NxI) input matrix with columns X
i, and Y is an (MxI)
output matrix with columns y
i. And the dual of the preceding programming
multiplier problem is the input-oriented linear programming envelopment (input-
oriented CCR DEA model):
TEI (x
o,y








where l is an (Ix1) intensity vector.
The input orientation model describes the minimum amount of inputs
required to achieve the given output level. The technology implied by the
constraints of the preceding envelopment problem is: C(y) = {x:x ³ Xl,y£ Y l ,
l³0}, xÎ
N
+. Then this problem provides a linear programming representation of
the radial efficiency measure given in Debreu and Farrell’s definition. The optimal
value of q provides a technical efficiency measure of the hospital under
evaluation. Input-oriented radial efficiency requires u
Ty
o = q = 1. A hospital is
judged to be technically inefficient if at optimum q < 1, and technically efficient
if at optimum q =1 .
The input-oriented CCR model incorporates the assumption of constant
returns to scale in production. Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) (BCC)
generalized the CCR formulation to allow variable returns to scale. A different













The dual of which is the input-oriented BCC DEA linear
programming envelopment problem is expressed as:
TEI (x
o,y











T is an (Ix1) row vector of ones. CCR and BBC models differ only
in that the latter includes convexity constrain (e
Tl=1)
The input-oriented CCR DEA model (constant returns to scale) measures
overall technical efficiency (OTE). The input-oriented BCC DEA model (variable
returns to scale) measures exclusively pure technical efficiency (PTE). Then,
following Banker et al (1984), the ratio between the two measures of efficiency
in CCR and BCC DEA models is a measure of scale efficiency (SE).
2. EFFICIENCY SCORES
We apply Data Envelopment Analysis to calculate overall and pure technical
efficiency for ninety-four Catalan acute care hospitals in 1990
15.
Variables to represent inputs and outputs were selected among those that
had been used primarily in the DEA hospital efficiency literature. Output is
defined in this paper as health services or intermediate outputs (throughputs). We
define a wide set of eight output variables: Case-mix adjusted discharged patients
(Y1); In-patient days in acute and subacute care medicine services, except intensive
care units (medicine, surgical, obstetrical, gynaecological and paediatric services)
(Y2); In-patient days in intensive care units, including intensive neonate and burnt
units (Y3); In-patient days in long-term (psychiatric, long stay, and tuberculous
services) and other services (Y4); Surgical interventions (Y5); Hospital day care
services (Y6); Ambulatory visits (Y7); Resident physicians (Y8). Selected output
variables represent the multi-output dimension of hospital production: inpatient
activities (admissions and in patient days), outpatient hospital services (visits and
15 Source: "Estadística de Establecimientos Sanitarios con Régimen de Internado, 1990".16
day care), and teaching activities (residents).
On the input side, four variables representing resource consumption are
defined: Full-time equivalent (FTE) physicians, including residents (X1); FTE
nurses and equivalents (X2); FTE other non-sanitary personnel (X3); In-patient beds
(X4). The first three inputs are labour inputs and the last one is a proxy for net
capital assets, as suggested by Grosskopf and Valdmanis (1987). Descriptive
statistics for input and output variables appear in Table 4. Table 5 summarize the
average overall, pure and scale efficiency scores from calculating DEA models.
[ Table 4 ]
[ Table 5 ]
Results from DEA models show an average technical inefficiency of
10.1%. That is to say, hospitals use in average 10.1% more inputs than necessary
if all of them were operating on the efficiency frontier. Overall efficiency scores
range from 0.545 to 1. Pure technical inefficiency scores show a lower level of
inefficiency, being the average 6.1%. Average scale inefficiency is 4.3%.
All hospitals on the frontier show no possible proportional reduction in
inputs, given output level, and no slack for any input. That is, boundary hospitals
are efficient boundary hospitals. For overall technical efficiency the percentage of
hospitals operating on the frontier is 36.3. The average efficiency score for
nonfrontier hospitals is 0.841, implying that non-efficient hospitals use on average
roughly 18.9 per cent more inputs per unit of output than efficient hospitals.
According to pure technical efficiency criterion, 50 of the hospitals operate
efficiently, with an average efficiency score of 0.871 for nonfrontier hospitals. The
efficiency ranking of the hospitals is reasonably stable with respect to the two
versions of DEA. Distribution of scores is summarized in Table 6.
[Table 6 ]
3. CENSORED REGRESSION OF EFFICIENCY SCORES
What causes a hospital to produce using more than the minimum quantity of
inputs for a specific vector of outputs? In order to determine the influence of
environmental variables on efficiency a two-stage approach is adopted.
Let z
i Î +; i = 1, ..., I; be a discrete or continuous environmental variable
which reflect causes or explanatory variables of inefficiency. Let w
i Î +; i=1 ,
..., I; be a discrete or continuous proxy variable for input or output characteristics17
omitted or imperfectly measured in DEA model (control variables for the input-
output specification). In the first stage, inefficiencies are calculated using a DEA
model in which the environmental variables are ignored and selected input and
output variables are used. In the second stage we define a model that includes both






i;i = 1, ..., I
DEA scores (q
i) can be understood as presenting a censored normal
distribution, that is to say, the values of the dependent variable in the regression
model above a threshold are measured by a concentration of observations at a
single value. In Chirikos and Sear (1994) an ordinary least square method is used
to explain the score differences. Here a censored Tobit model is proposed to avoid
asymptotically biased estimates from ordinary least squares (Greene, 1993). In this
case, the censoring takes the following form:
q
i = actual score if score < 1
q
i = 1 otherwise.
Tobit regression in a two-stage approach context used as cross-check, to
obtain validation of DEA results, constitutes an example of the complementary
capabilities of DEA and stochastic regressions. Censored regression model is used
to detect if measures of inefficiency are related to factors that one might expect
to be sources of inefficiency.
Factors explaining the performance of hospitals, measured by productive
efficiency, may be conceptualized in three categories: ownership, market structure
and regulation. In order to test the empirical impact of market concentration on
efficiency it is necessary to consider other relevant factors potentially explaining
efficiency. Partial tests, as those of Valdmanis (1990; 1992) limited to the effect
of ownership, may present statistical biases due to the misspecification of the
regression model. Ownership is considered by classifying hospitals in three types:
public hospitals, nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. Market structure or competition
is proxied by three variables: the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of local market
concentration, calculated for admission data, and the number of competitors in the
local market. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is specifically used for testing the
hypothesis that there is more efficiency in less concentrated markets. The presence
of regulation influences specially hospital behaviour through the payment system
and patient flow directive regulation. The proportion of hospital revenues received
from the NHS may be a proxy measure of the relative importance of regulation
in hospital activities. These monetary flows are influenced by NHS payment18
system corresponding to patients subject to NHS directive regulated flows. Then,
explanatory factors of efficiency are defined as: Nonprofit hospitals (Z1); For-profit
hospitals (Z2); Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market concentration (Z3); Number
of competitors in the local market (Z4); Proportion of service revenues from NHS
(Z5).
Control variables to test the influence of input or output characteristics
omitted or imperfectly measured in DEA model on efficiency are designed to
reflect differences in severity of treated cases, teaching status and differences in
outcome quality. There is no direct measure available on severity of illness. In this
situation, severity is proxied by the number of surgical interventions with more
than one hour of length per admitted patient. Outcome quality, the direct measure
of which is not available, is proxied by the proportion of discharged patients with
a recovered health status. Additionally, efficiency scores are controlled for the
potential influence of hospital dimension (scale economies) by including the
number of beds and square beds as a differentiated type of control variables. Since
overall technical efficiency scores assume that the efficient frontier exhibits
constant returns to scale, hospital size is probably an explaining factor. According
to the preceding arguments, control variables are empirically defined as: More than
one hour surgical interventions per one hundred patients (W1); Teaching status
(W2); Proportion of recovered discharged patients (W3); Number of beds (W4);
Number of square beds (W5).
Tobit regression results for DEA efficiency scores as dependent variables
are presented in Table 7. Tobit results have been checked, as in Kooreman (1994),
by re-estimating the model using rank indices of the scores as the dependent
variable. Results remained unchanged in terms of sign and significance.
Econometric results indicate that only the number of competitors in the local
market presents a significant contribution when explaining differences in overall
and pure technical efficiency scores. In both cases, the number of competitors
raises significantly the efficiency level. Hospitals operating as local monopolies,
those with very few local competitors, are less efficient than hospitals operating
in a more competitive environment. As results indicate, what influences efficiency
is the number of competitors rather than the level of concentration (market share).
Other factors apart from market structure do not show any relevance in explaining
observed levels of overall and pure technical efficiency. Then, ownership does not
make any difference in efficiency levels.
[Table 7]
Scale inefficiency appears very related to the hospital size, as expected, and
probably to decreasing returns to scale in larger hospitals. As results indicate,19
efficiency increases as hospital size increases but in a decreasing way. The
variable acting as a proxy of severity of illness (W1) appears contributing
positively to scale efficiency. W1 may also be acting as a proxy for specialization.
V. Conclusions
In this paper hospital markets in a European NHS are defined and measured using
observed flow of patient data. Regulated competition possibilities may be limited
by market dimension and concentration level. Our results suggest a two-tiered
market structure with 22 small hospital markets where producers operate as if they
were in geographical monopolies, and only one big market with a low level of
concentration.
Market definition in this study may be limited in several ways. First, using
a shipment approach to patient origin data to define local markets (Elzinga-
Hogarty criteria), potential competitors might not be identified by the patient
flows. Second, directive regulation of flows may also contribute to misidentify all
potential competitors. Third, competition to attract patients is obscured by the fact
that price competition is nowadays only possible in a very limited segment of the
market. And fourth, a heterogeneous product such as acute care may not be
sometimes the relevant product to identify the market.
Technical efficiency of hospital production has been analysed by means of
Data Envelopment Analysis. Results from DEA model suggest an average
technical inefficiency of 10.1% with 36.3% hospitals operating on the best-practice
production frontier. An stochastic censored regression of efficiency scores has
proved the positive influence of market structure on the level of efficiency attained
by every producer. The presence of competitors in the local market, independently
of their market share, improves technical efficiency. Hospital mergers justified by
expected improvements in scale efficiency may have a negative counterpart on
technical efficiency by eliminating potential competitors.
Problems of DEA frontier estimation are related to the existence of omitted
outputs or inputs not measured; and to the assumption of no measurement error
or random fluctuations in output. Although these problems have been managed in
this paper through the two-stage approach, this research might be extended in
several ways. Input and output variables might be improved, specially output
measures that take into account quality dimension of health. It is essential that the
relationship between quality and input volume would be accounted in the
measurement of inefficiency. The method employed in this paper might be used
when estimating allocative and cost efficiency rather than only limiting attention
to technical efficiency. Although we focus on hospital efficiency, we do not pay20
attention to find out if patients receive an appropriate amount of care.
Additional work on DEA measurement of hospital efficiency should
address specially two main problems. First, DEA ignores that the observation in
any data may be subject to random fluctuations. Deterministic scores should be
converted into stochastic ones, which may probably be obtained by the availability
of complete panel data or by the use of a chance constrain DEA model. Finally
DEA scores may be biased by the measurement problems in the input-output set,
which may be tempered by accurately measuring the change in the severity of
illness from admission to discharge.21
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Tables and Figures
TABLE 1. Summary Statistics 1990.
Population
a 6,059,494




















Average Length of Stay 8.56 days
No. of beds per 1,000 inhabitants 3.117
a Population residing in Catalonia in 1991. Source: Census 1991.26


















10 0 1 7.45 0.16 10,000 10,000
6 2 1 2.98 0.17 10,000 10,000
7 1 1 2.32 0.28 10,000 10,000
13 0 1 4.60 0.38 10,000 10,000
12 1 1 2.72 0.45 10,000 10,000
16 1 1 3.20 0.64 10,000 10,000
2 1 1 2.32 0.66 10,000 10,000
19 0 1 2.61 1.02 10,000 10,000
17 1 2 1.73 1.21 6,652 6,979
3 0 2 2.78 1.91 7,426 6,901
8 1 2 4.32 0.36 5,067 6,117
21 0 2 4.14 3.60 5,611 5,661
18 1 2 5.50 1.30 5,896 5,499
20 0 3 2.32 3.31 4,562 5,289
5 1 2 3.89 1.38 5,000 5,192
15 1 3 3.51 1.95 3,868 4,819
1 2 4 5.54 1.99 3,905 4,470
4 3 6 2.99 4.24 2,988 3,593
11 2 3 4.35 2.69 3,475 3,430
9 5 5 3.00 4.81 3,190 3,274
22 0 4 2.41 3.86 2,728 3,159
14 1 11 2.92 7.38 1,671 2,140
23 2 37 2.99 56.25 531 459
a HHIB: The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index using Beds as a unit of analysis.
b HHID: The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index using Discharges as a unit of analysis.27






















3.76 9.76 7.95 5.85 9.05 7.38 56.25
Mean of














































a HHIB: The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index using Beds as a unit of analysis.
b HHID: The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index using Discharges as a unit of analysis.
c Herfindahl>1,800; Market "Highly Concentrated". Source: 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (DOJ & FTC).28
TABLE 4. Descriptive Statistics of Input, Output, Explanatory and Control Variables (n=94)




















































































































TABLE 5. DEA Efficiency Scores
EFFICIENCY DEFINITION Mean Std Min Max
Overall Technical Efficiency (OTE)































































a Overall Technical Efficiency;
b Pure Technical Efficiency;
c Scale Efficiency.30


































































































Log-l -276.704 -206.315 -244.676
Log-l ratio
c 18.118 26.238 22.572
a Total observations: n=94
* Indicates significance at 5% level
b Standard errors in parentheses
c Log likelihood ratio test: Tests the joint significance of the independent variables. The likelihood ratio is computed as -
2log(Lo/La), where Lo is the value of the likelihood funtion if all coefficients except the intercept are zero, and La is the
value of likelihood for the full model. The log-likelihood ratio test has a Chi square distribution, where the degrees of
freedom are the number of restrictions imposed under the null hypothesis.31
FIGURE 1. Catalonia Market Areas